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Whether the true identity of a condition of moral responsibility?
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Whether the true identity of a condition of moral responsibility?
Annotation
PII
S2072-07260000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Evgeny Loginov 
Edition
Volume 13 Issue 2
Pages
173-184
Abstract
Many philosophers accept that moral responsibility is closely connected with personal identity. They usually claim that personal identity is a necessary condition for moral re­sponsibility since nobody should be blamed or praised for actions that they did not per­form. This article considers three paradoxes discovered in the process of a conceptual analysis of relations between moral responsibility and personal identity. The criteria of identity paradox states that we either cannot determine whether the identity of a person has survived in the duplication case, or we do so with petitio principii. The moral respon­sibility paradox shows that moral responsibility cannot be the symptom of personal iden­tity. The survival paradox displays that feeling of “being me” cannot be the symptom of personal identity. The article ends with a suggestion to either improve the theory of moral responsibility or adopt a metaphysics that could dissolve these paradoxes.
Keywords
personal identity, moral responsibility, survival
Date of publication
01.06.2020
Number of purchasers
22
Views
513
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
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References



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